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III. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from an Order Granting Summary Judgment entered
by Judge L.A. Dever of the Third Judicial District Court, Division
II, State of Utah, on August 13, 1997.
attached at Addendum A,

A copy of the Order is

Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (1953 as amended).

IV. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err by granting summary judgment

after the parties had filed conflicting affidavits as to the
commercial reasonableness of selling a repossessed vehicle at an
auto auction limited exclusively to wholesale dealers without any
attempt to sell the vehicle at a higher retail price?

(Issue

Preserved at R. 45-47).
This is a question of law which should be reviewed for
correctness.
1993).

Biqqens vt

Salt Lake County, 85 P. 2d 231 (Utah

No deference should be afforded to the trial court's

conclusion that the facts were not in dispute nor the court's legal
conclusion based on those facts. Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., 821 P.2d
458 (Utah App. 1991)(internal citations omitted).

This Court

should view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, who is the
appellant in this case.

Id.

3

2.

Did the appellant produce evidence enough to create a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether the sale of a
repossessed vehicle at an auto auction limited exclusively to
wholesale buyers without any attempt to sell the vehicle as a
merchant at a higher retail price

was commercially reasonable?

(Issue Preserved at R. 43-45).
Because this matter was decided on summary judgment, the
applicable standard of review is a correctness standard*
v. Salt Lake County, 85 P.2d 231 (Utah

1993).

Higgens

No deference should

be afforded to the trial court's conclusion that the facts were not
in dispute nor the court's legal conclusion based on those facts.
Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., 821 P.2d 458 (Utah App. 1991) (internal
citations omitted).

This Court should view the facts and all

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to
the non-moving party, who is the appellant.

Id.

Vf DPTEPMXNATJVE AUTHORITIES
Appellant

submits

that

the

following

authorities

are

controlling and entitle him to judgment as a matter of law:
STATUTES;
Section 70A-9-504, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended);
See Addendum B for the full provision of the statute.
Section 70A-9-507, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended);
See Addendum B for the full provision of the statute.
fiULSS;
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
See Addendum B for the full provision of the rule.
4

VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This appeal very simply involves the lower court's decision to
accept on summary judgment, despite the fact that there were
conflicting affidavits on point, that the sale of a repossessed
vehicle at a dealers-only auto auction with no other attempt to
sell the vehicle

for a higher

retail value

is commercially

reasonable within the meaning of the Motor Vehicles Act.
The case involved appellee Larry H. Miller Leasing Company's
("Miller")

repossession

of

appellant

Karl

E.

Jorgenson's

("Jorgenson") vehicle, a 1994 Plymouth Voyager van. After taking
possession of the van, Miller made no attempt to sell the vehicle
on its lot or by any retail means.

R. 44. Instead, Miller sold

the vehicle at an auto auction closed to the general public where
it could only be expected to get a wholesale price.

R. 45. Since

the vehicle sold for below the value of Jorgenson's loan, Miller
brought this action on January 21, 1997 seeking a deficiency on the
loan value in the sum of $6,160.17. R. 45.
Miller filed a motion for summary judgment on March 11, 1997
supported solely by an affidavit from a manager of its collection
department

stating that the auto auction was a commercially

reasonable means of selling the vehicle.

R. 9-17.

On April 28,

1997 Jorgenson objected to the motion for summary judgment and

5

filed a counter affidavit by a used car dealer of sixteen years.
R.

41-42.

The affidavit was evidence that the usual course of

business in the sale of a repossess vehicle was to first try to
obtain a retail value by selling the vehicle on the sales lot, and
that an automobile dealer would only resort to the auto auction in
extreme situations since the value obtained for the vehicle would
be at or below wholesale.

R. 41-42.

Despite these counter affidavits, the trial court granted
Miller's motion for summary judgment on August 13, 1997 and awarded
Miller the deficiency plus interest, attorney's fees and court
costs, in the sum of $8,484.72. R. 68-69.
On September 3, 1997 Jorgenson filed a Notice of Appeal in the
Third District Court, Division II, to appeal the question of
commercial reasonableness and the granting of summary judgment to
the Utah Supreme Court. R. 77. The supreme court poured-over the
appeal to this honorable Court of Appeals on October 29, 1997.

Ill, STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 26, 1994 defendant/appellant Jorgenson entered into
an agreement with Miller to lease a 1994 Plymouth Voyager van, VIN
1P4GH44R6RX251581 by signing the lease form provided by Miller
which gives Miller all the rights provided a secured creditor under
the Utah Commercial Code in the event of a default.

6

R. 19-20.

Miller repossessed the vehicle on November 6, 1996.

R, 22.

However, Miller made no effort to sell the vehicle publicly at any
of its retail locations or to obtain any retail sale or value for
the vehicle. R. 44-45.

Instead, Miller simply sent the vehicle to

the Utah Auto Auction to be sold.

R. 44-45.

The Utah Auto Auction is only open to dealers of vehicles who
pay wholesale or less for the vehicles and thus the appellant's
vehicle could not have been sold for its retail value. R. 41. Nor
could appellant have attended the sale and bid on the vehicle
himself.

R. 45.

Jorgenson was informed on December 10, 1997 that Miller had
sold the vehicle for $11,550.00 and that Miller owed the deficiency
balance of $6,160.17. R. 23.
Miller brought this action in Third District Court Division II
on January 21, 1997 to recover from Jorgenson the sum of the
deficiency plus interest, costs and attorney's fees.

R. 1-3.

Upon filing a motion for summary judgment March 11, 1997,
Miller offered the affidavit of Michael E. Stewart, a collection
manager for Miller. R. 9-17.

Stewart stated, among other things,

that the sale of the vehicle through the Utah Auto Auction was "a
commonly used method of dispossession of used vehicles and [was]
widely accepted in the industry as an effective, commercially
reasonable and good
vehicles."

faith means of disposing of repossessed

R. 13.

7

Jorgenson

objected

to

Stewart's

affidavit

as not being

admissible since Stewart was not an automobile dealer and was not
qualified to testify as to commercial reasonableness by a merchant
or dealer of automobiles-

R. 45.

Instead, Jorgenson filed in

opposition to the motion an affidavit by Gary Giffin, a used car
dealer of 16 years.

R. 41-42.

Giffin stated in his affidavit,

contrary to Stewart,
the customary practice of used automobile dealers in the
Salt Lake area and elsewhere [is] to hold the vehicle on
a used vehicle lot, expose the same to advertising from
the street or by newspaper for a period of time, usually
60 to 90 days. If the vehicle does not sell within that
period of time, then the dealer will wholesale the
vehicle at the Salt Lake Auto Auction or a wholesale
dealer.
R. 42.
The affidavits contradicted one another as to the commercial
reasonableness of selling the vehicle at the auction without any
exposure to the public.

R. 45-46.

Despite the two conflicting

affidavits, the court below signed the Order Granting Summary
Judgment against Jorgenson on August 13, 1997. R. 68.
Jorgenson filed a notice appealing the summary judgment order
on September 12, 1997.

R. 77.

8

IX, SWMftfiY QF THE ARSWENT
For the following reasons,

the Trial Court was incorrect in

granting the State's Motion for Summary Judgment:
1.

Summary judgment cannot be granted where opposing parties

have submitted conflicting affidavits on a question of fact.
2.
one

who

Appellant objected that appellee's affidavit was made by
lacked

determinations.

qualification

to

make

such

statements

and

However, appellee never objected to appellant's

affidavit by used car dealer Gary Giffin, thus the Court should
consider the appellant's affidavit admissible for purposes of
summary judgment.
3.

Since there were conflicting affidavits which raised

specific evidentiary facts, there was a genuine issue of material
fact and appellee was not entitled to judgment as matter of law.
4.

Appellant raised the affirmative defense that appellee

had sold the vehicle by commercially unreasonable means contrary to
the requirements § 70A-9-504 (3) , U.C.A., and therefore was not
entitled to the deficiency of the loan on the vehicle, which
appellee never disproved.
5.

The only evidence presented to the trial court as to the

commercial reasonableness of the sale of the repossessed vehicle
were the conflicting affidavits which alone should have precluded
summary judgment.

9
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I.

AROTMEflT

THE C Q W T SHQULD REVERSE THE QfiPSfi GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PECAUSE THE PARTIES HAD SUBMITTED CONFLICTING AFFIDAVIT?
THEREBY CREATING AN ISSUE OF FACT.
The trial court's order granting summary judgment was improper

as appellant had filed an affidavit of sufficient facts without
objection in opposition to appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment
and supporting affidavit. Conflicting affidavits create a question
of fact which must preclude summary judgment.

Arnica Mutual

Insurance Company v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989).
Appellee, in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment,
offered an affidavit by an employee, Miller?s collection manager,
Michael E. Stewart.

R. 9.

Stewart stated in his affidavit that

the automobile auction is "a commonly used method of disposition of
repossessed vehicles and is widely accepted in the industry as an
effective,

commercially

reasonable

disposing of repossessed vehicles."

and

good

faith

means

of

R. 14.

Appellant objected to this affidavit in his Memorandum in
Opposition to Summary Judgment as Stewart was not an auto dealer
and therefore was not qualified to speak with personal knowledge as
to the usual course of business of auto dealers.

R. 46.

Instead, appellant offered the affidavit of Gary Giffin who
had been a used car dealer for sixteen years as evidence of the
usual

course

of business

of

an

commercially reasonable manner.

auto

R. 41.

10

dealer

to

sell

in a

Affiant Giffin1s sworn

testimony was that it was not customary for auto dealers in Utah to
sell a repossessed vehicle at an auto auction without first trying
to sell the vehicle on their lot for a higher retail price. R. 42.
Thus, the two affidavits created a direct conflict over the
commercial reasonableness of selling a repossessed car at an auto
auction.

This Court has held previously

If, upon review of the record, it appears there is a
dispute as to a material factual issue, we are compelled
to reverse the trial court's determination and remand for
further proceedings on that issue. One sworn
statement

under oath is all that is necessary
of summary judgment.

to preclude

the

entry

Arnica Mutual Insurance Company v. Sghettler* 768 p.2d 950
(Utah App. 1989).
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows an order
of summary judgment where "[t]he pleadings, . . . together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law."

Thus, the trial court must consider all the

pleadings and affidavits of all parties and then find that the
material facts as presented create no genuine dispute so that the
movant is legally entitled to relief.
Affidavits which raise specific evidentiary facts create
genuine

issues which preclude an order of summary judgment.

Treloagan v. Trelogaan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985).

All it takes,

then, is "one sworn statement" of sufficient factual evidence to
defeat a motion for summary judgment. Arnica Mutual at 957.
11

In this case, the affidavit offered by appellant set forth
sufficient evidence of customary practice of merchants of motor
vehicles for selling vehicles, and the commercial unreasonableness
of relying exclusively on the Utah Auto Auction. R. 41-42. Miller
never moved to stike appellant's affidavit nor did they object to
the same in any way.
With an affidavit in support of summary judgment by appellee
to which appellant objected as being made without the appropriate
knowledge and authority, and an affidavit in opposition to summary
judgment

offered without

objection,

the

trial

court's order

granting summary judgment was improper and should be reversed.

II.

THE SALE OF A REPOSSESSED VEHICLE BY MEANS WHICH
DQ NQT ATTEMPT TO GAIN THE

SIgHEST RESALE VAI,UE IS COMMERCIALLY UNREASONABLEt
Selling a used vehicle at a dealers-only auction with no
attempt to sell it from a used car lot, expose it to the public or
otherwise obtain the highest selling price is not "commercially
reasonable" under Utah Code Annotated § 70A-9-504. Appellant made
this argument below, but the appellee never proved that selling
appellant's repossessed vehicle through the Utah Auto Auction was
a commercially reasonable public or private sale.

Therefore,

appellant should not have been liable for the deficiency which
resulted from Miller's unreasonable sale.
12

Utah law requires that a repossessed vehicle be disposed of by
the secured party in a commercially reasonable private or public
sale. U.C.A. § 70A-9-504. The statute requires that "'every aspect
of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and
terms must be commercially reasonable."
Section 70A-9-507(2) further provides that
If the secured party either sells the collateral in
the usual manner in any recognized market therefore or if
he sells at the price current in such market at the time
of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in conformity
with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the
type of property sold he has sold in a commercially
reasonable manner.
The Utah Supreme Court has defined a commercially reasonable
public sale as "a sale in which the public, upon proper notice, is
invited to participate and given full opportunity to bid upon a
competitive basis for the property placed on sale, which is sold to

the highest bidder."

pioneer ix>dge Center Inct v. glaufrensklee/

649 P.2d 28, 30 (Utah 1982)(internal quotations omitted).

The

purpose of the 'commercially reasonable' requirement is "to get the
best price obtainable for the truck."
127, 128 (Utah 1978).

Maas v. Allred, 577 P.2d

To that end, "The requirement of a public

invitation is essential

for a public sale under the Uniform

Commercial Code." Pioneer Dodae Center, Trie, at 30, quoting In re
Webb, 17 UCC Rep. 627, 630 (S.D.Ohio 1975).

Finally, if the sale

"was not conducted in a commercially reasonable manner, plaintiff
is barred from obtaining a deficiency judgment."
13

Pioneer Dodge

Centert Inct v. Glaubensklee at 31, citing FMA Financial CcrPt v
Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979).
In

Pioneer

Dodge, infra,

the plaintiff

who

repossessed

appellant's truck, placed the vehicle for sale on its own used car
sales lot, took it to several other car dealers who made bids on
the vehicle, and announced to prospective buyers in its dealership
that the vehicle would be sold for auction at the dealership.

The

Utah Supreme Court found that such actions on the part of appellee
still did not rise to a level of commercial reasonableness.

"These

efforts do not give reasonable notice to that part of the public
which would likely be interested in the sale."

Id. at 31.

Appellant asserted below that Miller made no effort to sell
appellant's vehicle through a commercially reasonable sale. R. 44.
The only means Miller used to sell the repossessed vehicle was to
consign it to the Utah Auto Auction lot which is closed to the
public and open only to automobile wholesale buyers.

R. 44-45.

Appellant produced evidence showing that vehicles at the auto
auction are usually sold at or below their wholesale value. R. 4142.

Clearly, the best price obtainable for the vehicle at a

wholesalers-only

auction would be lower than the best price

obtainable from a true public or private sale at one of Miller's
used car lots.

As a result, Miller only obtained a price of

$11,675.00 for the vehicle at auction.

14

R. 23.

This dispute over the commercial reasonableness of appellee's
sale of the repossessed vehicle created a substantial question of
fact under Utah law.

Thus, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied.

For the reasons and on the grounds stated above, appellant
prays the Court to reverse the trial court's Order Granting Summary
Judgment based upon the parties conflicting affidavits, to reverse
the trial court's order that appellant pay appellee damages in the
sum of $8,484.72, and to remand this case to the trial court for
determination based upon evidence to be produced at trial of the
commercial reasonableness of selling a repossessed vehicle at a
dealers-only auto auction at or below wholesale rather than selling
it publicly for the highest possible price.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of November, 1997.

/JOHN L. McCOY
Attorney for Appell

_/
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on November 10, 1997 I had two true and
correct copies of the Brief of Appellant mailed to the following by
first class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid:

Jeffrey W. Shields
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorney for Appellee Larry H. Miller Leasing
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444

16

ADDENDUM

A

Jeffrey W. Shields (USB #2948)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Post Office Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444
Telephone: (801)521-3200
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION II,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LARRY H. MILLER LEASING
COMPANY, a corporation,

:
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

:
:

Civil No. 970000647CV

:

Judge L. A. Dever

KARL E. JORGENSON,
Defendant.

Plaintiff, Larry H. Miller Leasing Company ("LHM"), having filed its Motion
for Summary Judgment in the above-captioned matter, and the Court having duly considered
the Memoranda and Affidavits of both parties in connection with the Motion for Summary
Judgment, and having rendered its Memorandum decision in accordance with Utah Code of
Judicial Administration Rule 4-501, and good cause appearing therefore, it is now by the
Court

223798.1

ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

That Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment be and herewith is,

granted as requested.
2.

Based upon the grant of Summary Judgment, JUDGMENT IS

ENTERED AGAINST DEFENDANT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AS FOLLOWS:
A. For the principal sum of $6,160.17;
B. For costs of this Action in the sum of $109.00;
C. For accrued contract interest rate of 18% per annum from the date
of the Complaint until July 15, 1997, in the sum of $539.00;
D. For interest following entry of judgment until satisfaction thereof at
the contract rate of 18% per annum which is $3.08 per day;
E. For attorney's fees in the sum of $1,676.55
FOR A TOTAL OF JUDGMENT IN THE SUM OF $8,484.72
F. And it is further Ordered that this judgment shall be augmented in
the amount of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees expended in collecting said judgment by
execution or otherwise as shall be established by Affidavit.
DATED this \j_

day of J$^, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

L.A. Dever
District Court Ju
223798.1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I did cause on the "3 I day of July, 1997, a true
and correct copy of an Order Granting Summary Judgment the to be mailed via U.S.
mail, first-class postage prepaid to:

John L. McCoy
Attorney for Defendant
310 South Main Street, #1314
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

223798.1
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ADDENDUM

B

70A-9-504. Secured party's right to dispose ot collateral after default — Effect of disposition.
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its then condition
or following any commercially reasonable preparation or processing. Any sale of goods is subject to the chapter on Sales
(Chapter 2). The proceeds of disposition shall be applied in the
order following to
(a) the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale or lease, selling, leasing and the like and,
to the extent provided for in the agreement and not
prohibited by law, the reasonable attorneys' fees and legal
expenses incurred by the secured party;
(b) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the
security interest under which the disposition is maoje;
(c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any
subordinate security interest in the collateral if written
notification of demand therefor is received before distribution of the proceeds is completed. If requested by the
secured party, the holder of a subordinate security interest must seasonably furnish reasonable proof of his interest, and unless he does so, the secured party need not
comply with his demand.
(2) If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the
secured party must account to the debtor for any surplus, and,
unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency.
But if the underlying transaction was a sale of accounts or
chattel paper, the debtor is entitled to any surplus or is liable
for any deficiency only if the security agreement so provides.
(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private
proceedings and may be made by way of one or more contracts.
Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at
any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of the
disposition including the method, manner, time, place and
terms must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is
perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a
type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable
notification of the time and place of any public sale or
reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale
or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the
secured party to the debtor, if he has not signed after default
a statement renouncing or modifying his right to notification
of sale. In the case of consumer goods no other notification
need be sent. In other cases notification shall be sent to any
other secured party from whom the secured party has received
(before sending his notification to the debtor or before the
debtor's renunciation of his rights) written notice of a claim of
an interest in the collateral. The secured party may buy at any
public sale and if the collateral is of a type customarily sold in
a recognized market or is of a type which is the subject of
widely distributed standard price quotations he may buy at
private sale.
(4) When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after
default, the disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all of
the* debtor's rights therein, discharges the security interest
under which it is made and any security interest or lien
subordinate thereto. The purchaser takes free of all such
rights and interests even though the secured party fails to
comply with the requirements of this part or of any judicial
proceedings
(a) in the case of a public sale, if the purchaser has no
knowledge of any defects in the sale and if he does not buy
in collusion with the secured party, other bidders or the
person conducting the sale; or
(b) in any other case, if the purchaser acts in good faith.
(5) A person who is liable to a secured party under a
guaranty, indorsement, repurchase agreement or the like and
who receives a transfer of collateral from the secured party or
is subrogated to his rights has thereafter the rights and duties
of the secured party. Such a transfer of collateral is not a sale
or disposition of the collateral under this chapter.
1977

70A-9-507. Secured party's liability for failure to comply with this part.
e
(1) If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance with the provisions of this part disposition
may be ordered or restrained on appropriate terms and
conditions. If the disposition has occurred the debtor or any
person entitled to notification or whose security interest has
been made known to the secured party prior to the disposition
has a right to recover from the secured party any loss caused
by a failure to comply with the provisions of this part. If the
collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has a right to recover
in any event an amount not less than the credit service charge
plus ten per cent of the principal amount of the debt or the
time price differential plus ten per cent of the cash price.
(2) The fact that a better price could have been obtained by
a sale at a different time or in a different method from that
selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to
establish that the sale was not made in a commercially
reasonable manner. If the secured party either sells the
collateral in the usual manner in any recognized market
therefor or if he sells at the price current in such market at the
time of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in conformity with
reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of
property sold he has sold in a commercially reasonable manner. The principles stated in the two preceding sentences with
respect to sales also apply as may be appropriate to other
types of disposition. A disposition which has been approved in
any judicial proceeding or by any bona fide creditors' committee or representative of creditors shall conclusively be deemed
to be commercially reasonable, but this sentence does not
indicate that any such approval must be obtained in any case
nor does it indicate that any disposition not so approved is not
commercially reasonable.
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Rule 56, Summary judgment
(a) For claimant, A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not folly adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing: that
there is a genuine issue for triad. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

